Family Support of the Disabled: A Legislative Proposal to Create Incentives to Support Disabled Family Members by McMullen, Judith G.
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 23
1990 
Family Support of the Disabled: A Legislative Proposal to Create 
Incentives to Support Disabled Family Members 
Judith G. McMullen 
Marquette University Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Disability Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Social Welfare Law Commons, and the 
State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Judith G. McMullen, Family Support of the Disabled: A Legislative Proposal to Create Incentives to 
Support Disabled Family Members, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 439 (1990). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol23/iss3/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FAMILY SUPPORT OF THE
DISABLED: A LEGISLATIVE
PROPOSAL TO CREATE
INCENTIVES TO SUPPORT
DISABLED FAMILY MEMBERS
Judith G. McMullen*
Parents of disabled children' face a difficult problem. They
frequently desire to provide continued support for their disabled
children. But disabled children require longer, more expensive
support than nondisabled children. The cost of such support is
astronomical, leaving many middle-class2 parents no choice but
to allow their children to rely upon social support programs for
living and medical expenses. Because of the current program eli-
gibility requirements, any contributions to the support of these
children will reduce or eliminate benefits to the child. Thus, par-
ents who cannot afford to support fully their disabled children
find it very difficult to contribute to the support of those chil-
dren in a meaningful way.
This Article argues that the current eligibility requirements
for social assistance programs create a disincentive for middle-
class parents who might otherwise contribute to the support of
their disabled children through gifts or inheritances. I suggest
that this disincentive be removed by creating a limited excep-
tion to the eligibility requirements for certain state and federal
assistance programs.
Provision for disabled children is, of course, only one part of
the ancient question of who should control the disposition of
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. A.B., University of Notre
Dame, 1977; J.D., Yale Law School, 1980. My thanks to Jay E. Grenig, Charles H. Mc-
Mullen and Jane Rutherford for their helpful comments and encouragement.
1. Throughout this Article, the terms "child" and "children" will be used to desig-
nate a familial relationship, and will thus apply to adults as well as to minors. The term
"disabled" will denote those persons whose physical or mental condition prevents them
from obtaining consistent and sufficient employment through which they could support
themselves.
2. The problem discussed in this Article is primarily a problem of the middle classes.
Poor people do not have enough money or property to have the option of giving it to
their children through gift or inheritance. Conversely, wealthy people have enough re-
sources to completely support their children without recourse to public assistance
programs.
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property, both during the owner's life and after the owner's
death. The concept of passing property down to one's children is
almost as old as Western civilization. Indeed, some societies rec-
ognized the property rights of descendants while the property-
owning ancestors were still living.3
Although the majority of Americans may agree with the con-
cept of descendant inheritance, the almost complete freedom of
testation permitted by American law produces many situations
contrary to this norm.4 A child is not legally entitled to receive
his parent's property unless the parent chooses to give it to
him.5 The parent may, for a variety of reasons, not want to give
property to her child.' She may disapprove of the child's life-
style or dislike his choice of mate.
In some situations, even if the parents wish to leave property
to improve the life of a surviving child and the child has a right
to the property, the law may impede such gifts. Parents of a dis-
abled child may not be able to leave property to that child with-
out disrupting the social support benefits to which the child oth-
erwise may be entitled. The parents may set up an estate plan in
which a child technically receives money or other property, only
to have it claimed by public authorities as reimbursement for
social services 7 or, similarly, to have the child face a dollar-for-
dollar reduction in disability benefits.8 The child's inheritance
cannot, in such a case, meaningfully improve the quality of the
child's life.
Several authorities in the field of estate planning have ex-
amined in great detail the options currently available to the par-
ents of disabled children.9 The options are limited. Ideally, laws
should address the concerns of the families of disabled children
while providing those families with the incentive to help bear
the financial costs of providing for their children. New legisla-
tion is needed to achieve this dual objective. This legislation
must establish a method by which parents can improve mean-
ingfully the quality of a surviving disabled child's life without
3. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
4. See Note, Family Maintenance: An Inheritance Scheme for the Living, 8 RUT.
CAM. L.J. 673, 674-75 (1977) (authored by Carol Dry Doup).
5. See id.
6. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Frolik, Estate Planning for Parents of Mentally Disabled Children, 40
U. PITT. L. REV. 305 (1979); Mooney, Discretionary Trusts: An Estate Plan to Supple-
ment Public Assistance for Disabled Persons, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 939 (1983).
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substantially increasing the social cost of supporting that dis-
abled child.'" This Article proposes one plan for such legislation.
Part I of this Article describes the change in focus in inheri-
tance from an institution that protects and benefits the family
to one that protects complete freedom of testation. This Part
shows how this shift has made it possible for parents to disin-
herit their children.
Part II describes the situation of the disabled child. There are
several federal and state social programs that are designed to
help disabled persons." This Article focuses on the Supplemen-
tal Security Income program (SSI) 12 to illustrate how the eligi-
bility requirements for such programs discourage middle-class
parents (as well as other interested persons, Such as grandpar-
ents) from contributing to the support of a disabled child. Al-
though other federal programs also create this disincentive, 13
SSI serves as an especially good illustration both because of its
widespread effect and because there are uniform federal regula-
tions interpreting the program. State programs have varying reg-
ulations and would unnecessarily confuse the discussion. 4
10. This is not the first proposal for some sort of legislative remedy to help parents of
disabled children (as well as the children themselves). See, e.g., Whitman, Present Poli-
cies Do Not Benefit Disabled Children (Guest Editorial), TR. & EST., Apr. 1989, at 10.
Professor Whitman suggests that "tax policy should be changed to encourage annual gift
giving by the parents to such children and to exempt such gifted funds from being
counted in determining the child's eligibility for public support." Id. at 62.
11. The most significant of these are the Medical Assistance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§
1396-1396s (1982 & Supp. V 1987), commonly referred to as Medicaid, and Federal Old-
Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits; id. §§ 401-33, which may be available
to a disabled child of a person who is entitled to Social Security where the child's dis-
ability began before age 22. 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (1989). Of course, a disabled child may
herself have worked enough prior to the disability to qualify for Social Security in her
own right. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
12. Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and Disabled, 42 U.S.C. §§
1381-1383c (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see 20 C.F.R. § 416 (1989). This program is often a
major source of support of noninstitutionalized disabled persons. It has been estimated
that 68% of working-age disabled adults are unemployed and dependent on some sort of
federal benefits. Brady, Save Money: Help the Disabled, N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1989, at
A19, col. 1.
13. See, e.g., Medical Assistance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1982 & Supp.
1987).
14. See, for example, Frolik's brief discussion of state standards:
For estate planning purposes it is enough to realize that state assistance may
come in the form of cash payments, or the provision of community or residential
services. Eligibility standards for state welfare assistance cash payments may or
may not parallel federal eligibility standards, and thus the particular state stan-
dards must be taken into account when determining what effect an outright gift
or bequest will have' upon the eligibility of the recipient for state assistance.
Frolik, supra note 9, at 320.
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Part III of this Article argues that SSI and similar programs
should offer a limited exception to the existing eligibility re-
quirements. The exception would provide incentives for families
to assume some responsibility for the support of disabled chil-
dren. My plan would allow a qualified trust that could provide
supplemental income and principal to a disabled beneficiary
without disqualifying him from receiving public benefits.15 The
trust payments would reduce government benefits proportion-
ately, but by much less than the current dollar-for-dollar reduc-
tion. Upon the child's death, the balance of the trust, if any,
would be subjected to a death tax. Finally, Part III examines
whether the proposal could achieve the intended social goals
without itself creating insurmountable difficulties.
I. THE FRAMEWORK OF INHERITANCE LAWS
Although some societies focus on how transfers of a dead per-
son's property can benefit the family or society," estate plan-
ning in the United States today focuses on the free disposition
of property during life or at death, according to the plan or
whim of a property owner. 7 This emphasis on individual free-
dom of testation is a relatively recent phenomenon in Western
countries.1"
The custom of passing property from the dead to the living
was once perceived as a benefit to the family and to society.
Having an orderly transition of property as directed by will or
laws of intestate succession eliminated an unseemly struggle
among survivors for possession of property at the owner's death
bed. 9 Earlier Western societies also viewed property, especially
land, as something in which living descendants already had an
enforceable interest.20 If inheritance laws still followed this
15. Such a trust could be utilized for either lifetime gifts or for inheritances. How-
ever, this Article will focus mainly on inheritance.
16. For example, the British family maintenance system allows certain specified per-
sons to petition a court to reform a decedent's will so as to provide support for depen-
dents. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975, ch. 63 § 1.
17. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
18. See Note, supra note 4, at 680 ("Historically, freedom of testation is a relatively
new concept, having arisen in sixteenth century England.").
19. G. GARDNER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 4 (2d ed. 1916); see also A. REPPY &
L. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS 2 (1928).
20. For example, in England during the middle ages a landowner could not will, sell,
or otherwise dispose of the ancestral land without the consent of his sons. In some parts
of Germany, sons could require a father to partition the land even during the father's
lifetime. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 248 (2d ed. 1968).
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model, parents of disabled children would have no opportunity
to reduce the child's share or to disinherit the disabled child
altogether.
Modern American rules governing inheritance, however, are
largely based on the right of a person to dispose of her own
property in any way she sees fit. Potential beneficiaries, includ-
ing children and other direct descendants, generally have no
ownership rights in property during the owner's lifetime and
have no absolute right to receive the property of any decedent.21
This freedom of testation is somewhat restricted by statutorily
imposed requirements that the testator provide for the surviving
spouse. A spouse may not be completely disinherited.22 In com-
munity property states, each spouse is presumed to own half of
the community property throughout the marriage, and this own-
ership continues after the death of one spouse. 3 In other states,
the spouse may elect to take a statutory share of the estate
rather than the share given under the will. 24
Although theoretically there .could be a similar prohibition
against disinheriting surviving offspring, disabled or otherwise,
this has not yet happened.25 Hence, a child can be intentionally
21. See Note, supra note 4, at 674-75.
22. See id. at 675 ("All states except South Dakota have some provision for the sur-
viving spouse. ... ) (citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 861.01(1) (1987-88): "SURVIVING SPOUSE'S ONE-HALF INTER-
EST IN MARITAL PROPERTY. Upon the death of either spouse, the surviving spouse retains
his or her undivided one-half interest in each item of marital property. The surviving
spouse's undivided one-half interest in each item of marital property is not subject to
administration .. "
24. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 2-8(a) (Smith-Hurd 1978):
If a will is renounced by the testator's surviving spouse, whether or not the will
contains any provision for the benefit of the surviving spouse, the surviving
spouse is entitled to the following share of the testator's estate after payment of
all just claims: 1/3 of the entire estate if the testator leaves a descendant or 1/2 of
the entire estate if the testator leaves no descendant.
25. See generally Kirkland, Should You Leave It All to the Children? FORTUNE,
Sept. 29, 1986, at 18 (discussing wealthy parents' decisions to disinherit their children).
Indeed, even living parents are not legally obligated to provide for the care of children
over the age of 21. See, for example, the Illinois statute dealing with public aid and
reimbursement therefor:
A husband is liable for the support of his wife and a wife for the support of her
husband. The parents are severally liable for the support of any child under age
21, except that a parent is not liable for a child age 18 or over if such child is not
living with the parent or parents.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 10-2 (1988). But see Van Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wash. 2d
390, 229 P.2d 333 (1951) (holding that a support order in a divorce case could not be
extended past the age of majority, but recognizing that the father might nonetheless be
compelled to support his adult child):
fT]he legal duty of a parent to support his normal children ceases at the age of
majority, but if any of them are so defective as to be incapable of self-support he
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disinherited by a parent.2"
Although a testator is no longer legally obligated to transfer
wealth to his descendants, this is still a fundamental desire of
many testators. However, because a property holder is no
longer obligated to make either inter vivos or testamentary
transfers of property to his offspring or to anybody else, he must
make a conscious decision as to how to distribute his property.
Many factors may influence this decision.
Among other things, a parent may consider the financial situa-
tions of his children in determining whether to make gifts or be-
quests to them. A financially secure child might receive less
whereas a needy child may be given more parental financial aid.
Sometimes parents consider the lifestyles of their children or
grandchildren. For instance, the "black sheep" of the family
may receive a lesser share of the estate, or no share at all. Fur-
ther, a parent may consider his own inclinations to give to char-
ity or to nonrelatives. Even a parent's own feelings about the
advisability of inheritance may come into play.2" Finally, a par-
ent's decision may be influenced by his perception that the
money will actually go to the child, as opposed to the child's
creditors, spouse, religious order, or the government. A parent,
who fears that his child will be unable to benefit from an inheri-
tance because some individual or institution will claim it, has
less incentive to leave property to the child at all. It is certainly
legal and, as we shall see, may be rational to disinherit a dis-
abled child.
owes a continuing obligation of support as long as it is necessary. This obligation
is one created by the common law.
Id. at 391, 229 P.2d at 334.
26. Most states permit a testator to disinherit his children if language specifically
expressing that intent appears in the will. J. RITCHIE, N. ALFORD, JR. & R. EFFLAND, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENT'S ESTATES AND TRUSTS 183 (6th ed. 1982).
27. Of course, not every parent wishes to leave property to her children. See
Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86
MICH. L. REV. 722, 737 (1988). However, the common inclination to do so is perhaps best
illustrated by the presumption in the law of wills that a testator did not intend to disin-
herit lawful heirs, absent a clear and unambiguous expression of intent to the contrary.
See, e.g., Lanison v. Record, 141 111. App. 3d 477, 481, 489 N.W. 2d 925, 928 (1986).
28. For example, Warren Buffett, a man with personal wealth estimated at $1.5 bil-
lion, has stated that he intends to leave the bulk of his vast fortune to charity because it
would be " 'antisocial'" to allow his children to inherit " 'a lifetime supply of food
stamps just because they came out of the right womb.'" Kirkland, supra note 25, at 18;
see also Langbein, supra note 23, at 737.
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II. THE DISABLED CHILD: PARENTAL QUANDARY
Frequently, parents of disabled children would like to plan
their estates so that each child, including a disabled child, will
receive a share of the property. In fact, concerns for the disabled
child's welfare after the parents are gone may make these par-
ents even more eager to provide for the child's lifelong comfort
and support. In addition to the, usual uncertainties about their
children's futures, parents of disabled children have even more
serious concerns. ' Unfortunately, few parents are likely to have
the financial resources to provide for either the short-term or
the long-term support of a disabled child. Medical expenses are
notoriously high, and the costs of institutionalization, whether in
private nursing homes or in state-run facilities, are astronomical.
Even the relatively modest expense of living in a group home or
a halfway house could, over the course of a few years, deplete
the financial resources of all but the wealthiest families." An ad-
ditional problem is the extreme difficulty, if not impossibility, of
accurately predicting the extent of care that will be needed by a
particular disabled person in the future.
The estate-planning problems associated with planning for a
potential beneficiary who is disabled are enormously compli-
cated because many of these disabled persons are eligible for
some type of public assistance.3 ' This eligibility could be jeop-
ardized, interrupted, or lost altogether if the disabled person is a
29. For instance, it may not be currently possible to assess the extent of the disabled
person's impairment. Also, new medical treatments may become available, or currently
available treatments may become advisable in the future. Leimberg & Hinkle, Financial
and Estate Planning for Parents of the Disabled, J. Am. Soc'y CLU & CHFC, May 1989,
at 38-39.
30. See, e.g., Schneider, Md. Plan to Charge for Care of Disabled Stirs Controversy:
Families of Retarded Oppose Schaefer Proposal, Washington Post, Jan. 30, 1989, at D1,
col. 1. As another example, the cost of 40 years of medical care for chronic schizophrenia,
with some hospitalization every three years (and no adjustment for inflation) has been
estimated to be $294,800. This includes acute-care hospitalization ($135,000), less intense
hospitalization ($6,000), outpatient visits ($66,200) and drugs ($87,600). Kranion, Psy-
chiatric Care: Orphan of Insurance Coverage, N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1989, at B16, col. 1
(table). This figure does not include food, housing or other living expenses during a pe-
riod when the schizophrenic will most likely be unable to work consistently, if at all.
31. At the end of June 1988, 38,436,593 beneficiaries received a total of $17.8 billion
in monthly cash benefits from the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
Benefits program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-33 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 51 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, 2-3 (Sept. 1988).
Seven percent, or 2,807,330 of these beneficiaries were disabled workers, who received an
average monthly benefit of $508.55. Also in June 1988, 4,412,500 persons received feder-
ally administered SSI payments which totaled $1.1378 billion, representing an average
payment of $258. This figure represents both federal SSI payments and federally admin-
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beneficiary of another person's estate. 2 Because most estates
contain insufficient assets to provide long-term support for a dis-
abled child,33 it will be important to preserve long term eligibil-
ity for public assistance.
A. The Supplemental Security Income Program (SSI)
SSI is a need-based program designed to provide a minimum
level of income to persons who are elderly (over sixty-five), dis-
abled, or blind.3 Unlike straightforward disability insurance,35
SSI requires neither that the disabled person be the child of a
person entitled to Social Security insurance benefits nor that the
child qualify for Social Security benefits due to her own employ-
ment.3 Whereas disability insurance is typically tied to the
amount of income earned prior to the disability, SSI is aimed at
maintaining a predetermined income level.37 SSI provides cash
stipends to disabled individuals whose income does not exceed
specified levels, but is not generally available to a prospective
beneficiary during a period of hospitalization.3 ' As one commen-
tator has noted: "Although conceived primarily as a substitute
and supplement to Social Security insurance for the aged[,] the
program is moving towards serving more disabled than aged." '39
Income is defined as "anything you receive in cash or in kind
that you can use to meet your needs for food, clothing, or shel-
ter. In-kind income is not cash, but is actually food, clothing, or
istered state supplementation. In addition, state-administered supplements are available:
269,850 individuals received such payments in March 1988. Id. at 3.
Eligibility for these programs may be based on entitlement or on need. See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.130-.133, 416.202 (1989). Need-based programs, such as SSI, have very strict eligi-
bility requirements which can be easily violated by acceptance of even a modest gift or
bequest. See id. §§ 416.200-.214.
32. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.11 2 1(g) (1989) (including gifts and inheritances in unearned
income).
33. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.101-.2227
(1989). For an excellent discussion of estate planning where the client is eligible for SSI,
as well as an excellent discussion of estate planning to preserve eligibility for state insti-
tutional care and Medicaid, see Mooney, supra note 9, at 954-63.
35. E.g. Federal Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§
401-403 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); see 20 C.F.R. § 404 (1989).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
37. S. Mezey, No Longer Disabled: The Federal Courts and the Politics of Social
Security Disability 28-29 (1988).
38. Frolik, supra note 9, at 316-17 (discussing 20 C.F.R. § 416.231 (1978)).
39. Id. at 317.
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shelter, or something you can use to get one of these."4 The
term "income" includes both earned and unearned income, and
receipt of more than a minimal amount of either will result in a
dollar-for-dollar reduction of SSI benefits.4 1 Gifts and inheri-
tances are considered income.42
In addition to income-level limits, eligibility for SSI requires
that a disabled person have no more than minimal resources:
[R]esources means cash or other liquid assets or any real
or personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any)
owns and could convert to cash to be used for his or her
support and maintenance.
(1) If the individual has the right, authority or power
to liquidate the property or his or her share of the prop-
erty, it is considered a resource. If a property right can-
not be liquidated, the property will not be considered a
resource of the individual (or spouse). 3
Certain assets (e.g., an owner-occupied home), however, are ex-
cluded from the definition of resources.44
As these stringent requirements make clear, the SSI program
provides a safety net only for those people who have neither sig-
nificant assets nor any means of support. Thus, any property
given to a disabled child, either inter vivos or at death, will re-
sult in equivalent reduction in SSI benefits, because gifts and
inheritances, whether in cash or in kind, are considered income
of the recipient.
B. Two Social Principles in Conflict
The policies and goals behind SSI are inextricably linked to
the political choices made to implement the entire Social Secu-
rity system. On the one hand, Congress wanted to provide a
safety net so that people would not face dire poverty at the end
of their working years.45 On the other hand, Congress desired to
40. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1989).
41. Id. §§ 416.1104, -.1110 to -.1112 (earned income rules); id. §§ 416.1120-1124
(unearned income rules).
42. Id. § 4 16.11 2 1(g).
43. Id. § 416.1201(a).
44. Id. § 416.1212.
45. See S. MEZEY, supra note 37, at 27.
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maintain incentives-so that potential beneficiaries would choose
to remain self-sufficient to the greatest extent possible.'
Many politicians opposed simply doling out money to "poor
people," however they might be defined. Several opposed need-
based welfare programs and maintained that even government
aid should be earned or purchased. 7 Social support programs
such as SSI reflect a tension between the policies of distributing
benefits according to need and allocating them in proportion to
how fully they have been earned by payment of taxes.' SSI
epitomizes the allocation-based-on-need concept that character-
izes a welfare system, whereas other programs'9 demonstrate the
entitlement philosophy.5"
The original Social Security programs enacted in 1935 pro-
vided pensions and unemployment insurance,5' two programs
which were philosophically consistent with the notion that these
benefits were somehow earned through previous employment.2
President Roosevelt, however, immediately appointed a commit-
tee to study programs for disability insurance; the Social Secu-
rity Board, which adopted the committee's proposal, continued
to push for enactment throughout the 1940s and into the
1950s.11 The reasoning was simple: any social insurance program
which claimed to offer protection against interruption of income
would have to take into account the possibility of disability due
to illness.5 4
46. See Mashaw, Disability Insurance in an Age of Retrenchment: The Politics of
Implementing Rights, in SOCIAL SECURITY: BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS 151, 154
(1988) (claiming that "Itihe commitment to maintaining work incentives in a market
economy delayed the addition of disability insurance in Social Security"). Note the im-
plicit assumption that self-sufficiency, or lack thereof, is a matter of choice.
47. See S. MEZEY, supra note 37, at 27-45; cf. 79 CONG. REC. 7,839 (1935).
48. S. MEZEY, supra note 37, at 27. The current federal programs are traceable to the
Social Security Act of 1935. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 621 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397e (1982 & Supp. V 1987)). Early proponents of the
Social Security program characterized the program as insurance that was effectively pur-
chased by workers from the government. The notion that people were entitled to the
benefit payments answered the objections of those who opposed government payments
on the grounds that these were welfare payments that fostered dependency upon the
government. See S. MEZEY, supra note 37, at 27-45; see also Ball, The Original Under-
standing on Social Security: Implication for Later Developments in SOCIAL SECURITY:
BEYOND THE RHETORIC OF CRISIS, supra note 46, at 17-39.
49. E.g., Federal Old-Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance Benefits, 42 U.S.C. §§
401-433 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
50. See S. MEZEY, supra note 37, at 28-29.
51. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 621 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301-1397e (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
52. See Mashaw, supra note 46, at 154.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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The disability program which finally began in 1956 struggled
to balance the concerns over work incentives with concerns over
the reasonable provision of social insurance to those who most
needed it. In the words of Jerry L. Mashaw, "Adequate and
comprehensive coverage competes with the desire to eliminate
free tickets out of the work force."55 In determining who is eligi-
ble for benefits,50 the philosophy of the Social Security disability
programs is essentially very restrictive. Mere need does not con-
stitute sufficient grounds for social assistance: the programs are
designed to help those who cannot help themselves. 7
Despite the movements to expand the restrictive eligibility
definition, the SSI program has retained its emphasis on limit-
ing eligibility to the neediest group: those persons unable to
maintain any meaningful job in the economy, and having only
minimal assets.58 After all, society must pay for even meager
benefits. Both federal disability benefits and state support pro-
grams depend upon budget considerations. The limited re-
sources available are only sufficient to provide a certain mini-
mum care level." If fewer people receive those benefits, the
minimum care level can be higher.6 0
In addition to limiting the allocation of scarce resources to
those who need them most, restrictions on eligibility for pro-
grams such as SSI are a response to the concern that providing
55. Id. at 156.
56. Once the decision has been made to award disability benefits based on need, the
level of benefits that will be adequate must be determined. The question really has two
parts: 1) What circumstances will make a person eligible for benefits; and 2) what stand-
ard of living should the benefits support for a person who is deemed eligible to receive
them? This Article addresses the factors involved in answering the first question.
57. This reflects a deeply ingrained philosophy:
It is, strictly speaking, the pauper, and not the poor man, who has claims on
public charity. It is not one who is in want merely, but one who, being in want, is
unable to prevent or remove such want. There is the idea of helplessness as well
as of destitution. We speak of those whom society must aid as the dependent
classes, not simply because they do depend on society, but because they cannot
do otherwise than thus depend. Cold and harsh as the statement may seem, it is
nevertheless true that the obligation of the state to help is limited to those who
are unable to help themselves.
State ex rel. Griffith v. Osawkee Township, 14 Kan. 322, 324 (1875) (emphasis in origi-
aal), quoted in R. GOODIN, PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE 146-47 (1985).
58. S. MEZEY, supra note 37, at 40; cf. Mashaw, supra note 46, at 156-58.
59. See, e.g., Schneider, Budget Limits Hamper Mentally Disabled Aid: Extra $10
Million Proposed for Md. Services, Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1989, at D7, col. 5.
60. This assumes, of course, that the same amount of resources will be allocated to
the Social Security pool even if the number of potential recipients changes. In reality,
this might not happen. The Article assumes, however, that what was theoretically availa-
ble in one situation could also be made available in the other situation. Fewer people
receiving disability may mean more resources available for those who are receiving bene-
fits or it may mean a lower overall taxpayer cost, or both.
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government funds will foster dependency on the government
and will discourage independence and self-support. 1 This con-
cern assumes that the person who is potentially eligible for ben-
efits is the only one to induce to provide support. In fact,
though, the disabled person's friends and relatives could be en-
couraged to support her, which would make the disabled person
at least partially independent of government support, if not self-
sufficient.
Because the purpose of SSI is to provide only for those who
have virtually no resources, any gift or inheritance from family
members may result in a disabled person losing eligibility for
public benefits.82  Moreover, the property received may be
claimed by the state or by other creditors as reimbursement for
previous expenditures,63 leaving the disabled person without re-
sources and needing to have SSI and other public benefits rein-
stated. Thus, a system that has limited its potential beneficiaries
partly on the theory that they will therefore become motivated
to support themselves has overlooked the fact that relaxing eligi-
bility requirements might provide an incentive to a different
group, namely members of the disabled person's family, who
could insure at least partial independence from government sup-
port for the disabled.
C. An Incentive to Disinherit
The structure of the current federal program provides a strong
incentive to disinherit the disabled child. This is so because pay-
ments to the child will reduce or cause termination of disability
payments, but unless the gift or inheritance is extremely large, it
may not meaningfully or continuously improve the beneficiary's
standard of living. Moreover, when the gift or inherited property
is exhausted, there may be a delay in reinstating payment of the
disability benefits. Faced with such ungratifying prospects,
many people will conclude that a gift or bequest is not a good
idea and will search for other options. 4
61. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
62. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100 (1989).
63. See, e.g., Estate of Dodge v. Scott, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1979) (trustee having
discretion to distribute trust funds for disabled beneficiary's care and maintenance com-
pelled to invade trust to reimburse nursing home for services provided).
64. See generally Mooney, supra note 9 (discussing extensively other estate planning
options).
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Consider the example of a person receiving SSI benefits in the
amount of $336 per month.6 5 Suppose this person's parents have
a modest income and a projected estate of $100,000 consisting of
equity in their house and some savings. The parents have four
children, including the disabled child, and would like the chil-
dren to share the estate equally. Even if the parents were willing
to disinherit the other three children (which most are not),
$100,000 would not generate enough income to provide for the
long-term support of the child, 6 particularly if, as is often the
case, the child requires intermittent hospitalization. 7
If the disabled child's $25,000 share were placed in trust, it
could generate $208 of supplementary income per month.6
Combined with the child's SSI benefits, this could improve the
child's quality of life considerably, giving him the means to
purchase clothes, train tickets home for the holidays, modest en-
tertainment, or a better place to live. In fact, however, it would
only mean a dollar-for-dollar reduction in his SSI benefits.6 9 The
payments from the trust do not provide any significant financial
benefits to the disabled child, although they do provide the gov-
ernment with a benefit: money it need no longer pay to the
child.70
65. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.410 (1989).
66. Although at current interest rates $100,000 could generate more than $336 per
month in income, this hypothetical SSI recipient would also be eligible for a total pack-
age of other public benefits such as Medicaid. One hundred thousand dollars probably
could not generate enough income to support the medical care and living expenses that
are provided by this combination of benefits, nor could expenditures of the principal do
so for long. This Article uses the Social Security disability program as an example of how
difficult it is to contribute meaningfully to the support of a disabled person who would
otherwise be eligible for public benefits.
67. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
68. This assumes a rate of return of approximately 10%.
69. Actually, an SSI recipient may receive $20 in unearned income per month, with-
out any reduction in benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1124(c)(12) (1989). Additional unearned
income results in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the amount of SSI benefits. See id. §§
416.410-.414. Thus, a trustee could distribute $20 in cash per month without triggering a
benefit reduction.
70. Professor Frolik has stated the problem succinctly: "Gifts to a disabled child
which reduce the child's state or federal aid are not gifts to the child: they are gifts to
the state or federal government." Frolik, supra note 9, at 315.
The government must, however, perform a delicate balancing act. Jerry Mashaw dis-
cusses how we can balance the social value of giving disability benefits to the severely
handicapped with the social costs, such as lost productivity when someone leaves the
work force or lower taxpayer morale due to supporting unemployed persons. "Those who
are most deserving, that is, those with respect to whom we derive the most satisfaction
from paying benefits, are also those from whom society loses least when they leave the
work force. And their support at public expense imposes very small psychic costs on
taxpayers." J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 83 (1983).
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Faced with this prospect, parents may wish to disinherit the
disabled child or leave him only a token amount of property. In
either case, the parents may hope that the child's siblings will
informally share their own inheritances with the child.
A system that provides an incentive to disinherit a disabled
child has a two-fold effect. First, it virtually assures that the dis-
abled will not improve their standard of living. Second, it cre-
ates a situation whereby people who have some resources will
not use them in a way that could lessen society's burden of car-
ing for the disabled. The end result is that the disabled remain
at a subsistence level and the government alone bears the
expense.
D. Current Estate-Planning Options
Many estate planners have grappled with the problem de-
scribed above. 71 The fact that a moderate-sized estate may be
insufficient to support a disabled child for any length of time is
complicated by the reality that many parents would like to di-
vide that moderate estate among all of their children. The alter-
natives facing these parents are far from ideal. The parents have
the following options: leave the disabled child an outright estate
share, make the child the beneficiary of a support trust, com-
pletely disinherit the child, or make the child the beneficiary of
a wholly discretionary, or so called "luxury" trust. In addition,
there is the possibility in some states of a state-sponsored "self-
sufficiency trust. '72 The first four of these options have been
thoroughly discussed in the literature,73 and will only be dis-
cussed briefly here.
1. Outright share or share in a support trust- The futility
of giving an outright share of the estate to the disabled child is
usually obvious after an examination of public assistance eligi-
bility requirements. However, parents sometimes consider giving
their entire estate to the disabled child, while giving only token
amounts to the other children. The rationale behind this method
It seems logical to assume that where the society benefits from providing benefits in
appropriate circumstances, the society would also benefit from removing benefit pay-
ments from certain people whose circumstances make them less obviously appropriate
recipients of benefits. Hence, the government will sometimes have an incentive to reduce
certain benefit payments and preserve the resources for other purposes.
71. See supra note 9.
72. See infra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Frolik, supra note 9; Leimberg & Hinkle, supra note 29; Mooney, supra
note 9.
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of distribution is that the family resources will be marshalled for
the member of the family most in need of them. An outright
share has the advantage of supporting the disabled child as long
as possible, but it may well alienate the other children as well as
offend the parents' notions of fairness. Moreover, even requiring
this kind of sacrifice from the nondisabled children will .only as-
sure lifetime security for the disabled child in the handful of
cases where the parents' estate is large enough to finance the
staggering costs of lifetime support.
Leaving the disabled child's share of the estate in a support
trust creates the same problems as leaving an outright share.
Any creditor that has provided support to the beneficiary, in-
cluding the state, can claim reimbursement from the trust."
Thus, leaving an outright share to a disabled child or making
that child the beneficiary of a support trust are essentially non-
options. At the least, these provisions will destroy the child's eli-
gibility for public support programs.7 5 In addition, the inheri-
tance or trust funds may be subject to back claims for
reimbursement of state benefits previously provided. At worst,
the funds will run out quickly and the child will be back on pub-
lic support programs without ever having realized any real bene-
fits from his parents' resources.
2. Disinheritance- The parents may also disinherit the dis-
abled child and leave all of the estate to the other siblings.
Where the estate is modest and concerns about interfering with
public benefit eligibility are paramount, this may seem to be the
most sensible option. Parents may be less reluctant to disinherit
where they have an informal understanding with one or more of
the other children that the disabled child will be provided with
whatever care or luxuries are not provided by public programs.
However, the practice of disinheriting the disabled child has a
number of drawbacks. First of all, the disabled child may feel
abandoned or rejected by the parents. Second, if the parents ex-
pect the other children to financially support the disabled child,
this arrangement places a heavy burden on the siblings who
must manage the money.76 Third, because the money must be
given directly to the other siblings and is not held in trust for
74. Mooney, supra note 9, at 943; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 147
(1959).
75. See supra note 7-8 and accompanying text.
76. For example, because the nondisabled sibling owns the property, she will be
obliged to pay tax on any income from that property. The sibling may feel morally obli-
gated, however, to expend all of the before-tax dollars for the disabled person. Mooney,
supra note 9, at 940.
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the disabled child, it is available to the creditors of the other
children. The other children may experience conflicts of interest
between providing for their disabled sibling and improving the
quality of life for their own families. Finally, the siblings may
predecease the disabled child, in which case the property inher-
ited from the parents would be in the siblings' estates, and dis-
posed of accordingly.::
3. Wholly discretionary trusts- Parents may also choose to
utilize a wholly discretionary, or luxury, trust. With this type of
trust, the parents attempt to avoid the forced invasion of trust
funds to reimburse state agencies for provision of support to the
disabled beneficiary. The theory is that the creditor state cannot
demand any more property from the trust than can the benefi-
ciary. Where disbursement of principal and income is wholly
within the trustee's discretion and not tied to a standard of use
for the support and welfare of the beneficiary, the beneficiary
has no absolute right to receive anything from the trust.78 Be-
cause the trustee has no obligation to support the beneficiary,
those governmental agencies who do provide support cannot
look to the trustee for reimbursement,79 nor is the undistributed
property in the trust treated as a resource for purposes of deter-
mining SSI eligibility."0
Once money is paid out to the beneficiary, however, two
things happen. First, the state may claim reimbursement from
the beneficiary for past support and, second, the amount of
money or property received by the beneficiary may disqualify
him from eligibility for federal or state benefits. The only practi-
cal way to avoid these undesirable consequences is to provide in-
kind "extras"-plane, train and bus tickets home, modest en-
tertainment, payment of noncovered dental bills, and the
like-and only small amounts of cash. Such in-kind payments
would not be considered cash, food, clothing, shelter, or some-
thing which could be used to obtain one of these."1 The use of
the trust to provide "extras" to supplement the support already
being received is the reason behind the name "luxury trust."
77. Id.
78. See G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 41 (5th ed.
1973). For an excellent discussion of the complex issues of trust law which are involved
here, see Frolik, supra note 9, at 328-37.
79. Mooney, supra note 9 at 950-54.
80. Id. at 956-57 (discussing DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, SI 01120.105 A.2. (Pub. No. 68-05D1120)
(1981)).
81. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1102-.1103 (1989); see also Mooney, supra note 9, at 958-60.
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The use of luxury or discretionary trusts has been approved
by courts or statute in some states.82 Other states have statutes
or case law that allow the principal or interest of such trusts to
be claimed as reimbursement for state support.8 3
Luxury trusts suffer their most severe limitation under federal
relief programs. The chief concern is that any payments from
the trust not disqualify the beneficiary from SSI, which may be
the primary means of support for nonhospitalized disabled per-
sons. As discussed above, any payments in cash or in kind that
are or can be used for support will cause a dollar-for-dollar re-
duction in SSI payments. 4
If the trustee is authorized to distribute funds to enable the
beneficiary to afford more expensive rent or better quality
clothes, for example, these will be deemed to be payments used
for support, which will trigger a dollar-for-dollar reduction in
SSI payments. The trust funds could be used to provide things
that are not included in the definition of support, for example,
dental services that are not covered by public benefits or tuition
to enroll in a course. These are certainly improvements to the
beneficiary's life. However, sometimes better housing, more food,
and warmer clothes are the things that a disabled beneficiary
most needs to improve the quality of life. Yet distribution of
trust funds for these purposes will cause a dollar-for-dollar ben-
efit reduction, which means that the beneficiary will not have
more dollars to spend on support, but rather will have the same
number of dollars, only from a different source. Thus, the trust
cannot disburse funds in a way that is most likely to improve
the quality of a disabled beneficiary's life.
4. Self-sufficiency trusts- A so-called "self-sufficiency
trust" provides yet another option. A self-sufficiency trust con-
sists of a pool of assets contributed by participating families.
The trust funds are invested, and the interest earned is used to
provide services for the disabled members of the participating
families. Illinois has set up such a program, which is being used
82. See, e.g., WIs. STAT. § 701.06(5m) (1987).
83. See, e.g., Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. First
Nat'l Bank, 104 Ill. App. 3d 436, 432 N.E.2d 1086 (1982) (holding that interests of bene-
ficiaries in spendthrift trusts were "estates" within meaning of statute enabling state
agencies to claim reimbursement for services from the beneficiary's "estate"). Trusts
which are more clearly limited in purpose (such as most luxury trusts) could still be
immune from state claims for reimbursement under the language of this decision. How-
ever, the court's reasoning relied heavily on the public policy argument that persons who
have any sort of trust interest are not the needy persons for whom cost-free care should
be provided. Id. at 465-66, 432 N.E.2d at 1088-89.
84. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
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as a prototype for programs in. other states.8 5 The Illinois model
includes a charitable trust fund, which will be funded with con-
tributions from private donors, private business, and founda-
tions. It will provide services for disabled persons whose families
cannot afford to enroll them in the regular self-sufficiency trust
program. When a disabled participant in the regular self-suffi-
ciency plan dies, some of the principal from the original family
contribution may pass to surviving family members, but at least
half of it must be paid to the charitable trust.86
The self-sufficiency trust is intended to supplement rather
than supplant Social Security disability (as well as Medicaid)
benefits.8 7 Trust expenditures will not cause a reduction or ces-
sation in SSI benefits, because the trust does not make cash dis-
tributions. Rather, it finances services that will enhance the
quality of life for the disabled beneficiaries, so that the trust ex-
penditures are not income-they are not "anything you receive
in cash or in kind that you can use to meet your needs for food,
clothing, or shelter."8 8 Indeed, the services include social and
medical services that are specifically exempted from the defini-
tion of income. 9
Some communities have organizations that attempt to provide
services similar to those provided by a state-sponsored self-suffi-
ciency trust. Such organizations employ staff members who pro-
vide enrolled disabled persons with help in the management of
their personal or financial affairs. These services are provided at
an agreed-upon hourly rate, which may be funded by income
from an enrollment fee or by income from a trust set up for that
purpose.9 0
5. Combination plans- Many parents opt for some varia-
tion of the preferred option of dividing the estate among all of
the children. Simply leaving a proportionate share to the dis-
85. See Teltsch, Illinois Project Gives Families a New Way to Aid Disabled Kin,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1988, at Al, col. 6. The Illinois program is codified at ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 911/2, para. 5-118 (1988).
86. ILL. REV. STAT. 85 ch. 911/2, para. 5-118 (1988); Teltsch, supra note 85.
87. Teltsch, supra note 85.
88. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102 (1989); see Teltsch, supra note 85.
89. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103 (1989); see Teltsch, supra note 85.
90. One such organization, PLAN (Planned Lifetime Assistance Network), exists in
Charlottesville, Virginia. This organization requires interested relatives (usually parents)
to set up a "lifetime advocacy trust," which they can control during their lifetimes. After
the death of the relative, the trust income is used to pay for PLAN services for the
disabled family member. When the disabled person dies, 25% of the principal must be
paid to PLAN, while the remainder may be distributed to persons designated by the
contributing relatives. See Topolnicki, Protecting the Future of a Child Who's Handi-
capped, MONEY, Nov. 1988, at 94, 99.
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abled child will lead to the many complications already dis-
cussed. To avoid these problems, the disabled child's share can
be placed in a discretionary luxury trust, a self-sufficiency trust,
or a privately run trust that provides services to the disabled
beneficiaries. Sometimes, a combination of these options may
produce a workable solution." For most families, this may well
be the best way to handle the situation.
Even a well-designed plan is no panacea. Although parents
seek to improve the quality of the disabled child's life, the kinds
of services and "extras" provided by luxury or self-sufficiency
trusts do not directly improve the most essential factors in de-
termining the overall quality of the disabled person's life-living
quarters, food, or clothing. As described above, the eligibility
rules for benefits remove any incentive for parents or other rela-
tives to contribute for primary support.92
III. THE CASE FOR A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
Ideally, programs such as SSI should provide a safety net for
those without resources while maintaining incentives for parents
and other relatives of potential beneficiaries to contribute to the
support of disabled family members. Of course, achieving both
of these goals is difficult, if not impossible. Eligibility require-
ments could not, for instance, be based on parental financial cir-
cumstances, as are educational loans.9 3 Such a system would
force parents to be financially responsible for adult children, and
our society is unlikely to require such responsibility.9 4 We can-
not discount the possibility that some families will refuse to sup-
port their members, even if the consequence is destitution for
the disabled family member. The present system, however, tends
to destroy the incentive to help support disabled family mem-
bers. Given the danger of interruption or discontinuation of SSI
and other benefits, middle-class parents have little incentive to
contribute at all.
91. See, for example, the plan devised by the Bannings, a young couple whose only
child is retarded. The plan included a discretionary spendthrift trust and PLAN services.
Id.
92. See supra Part II.C.
93. Eligibility for student loans is based largely on financial circumstances, including
the financial circumstances of the student's parents. See generally 34 C.F.R. § 682
(1989).
94. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
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To meet the dual objectives of encouraging parents to support
their disabled children and reducing-or at least not increas-
ing-costs to society, a program must satisfy three conditions.
First, it must assure parents that the child will not lose whatever
minimal quality of life has been achieved. In particular, the
child should not be disqualified from receiving SSI. Second, the
child must receive a higher standard of living as a result of the
parents' efforts. This does not occur, for example, when parental
support results in a dollar-for-dollar reduction in' SSI and leaves
the child with virtually the same income as before; nor does it
occur when funds from the parents disqualify the child from
public benefits. In the latter case the parents' money supports
the child at a minimum level for a short time, and, when that
money is gone, the child returns to the public aid that provided
that minimum level originally. Third, from society's perspective,
the program should not provide SSI support for families wealthy
enough to support their own disabled child.
Current Social Security regulations do little to balance the
conflicting interests of society and the disabled. If we could pro-
vide an incentive for parents and other family members to sup-
port the disabled child to the extent they are comfortably able,
we could reduce the social costs of caring for the disabled.
I propose an exception to the current SSI eligibility require-
ments permitting interested persons to establish qualified trusts.
These trusts would supplement SSI benefits with income and
principal and thus improve the quality of life for designated dis-
abled persons."6
A. Characteristics of the Proposed Qualified Trust
This new qualified trust would allow payments for disabled
beneficiaries, but if the trust met certain requirements these
payments would not cause a dollar-for-dollar reduction in SSI
benefits. Only the disabled child would be eligible to receive
trust property during that child's lifetime, and at the child's
death the remainder could be taxed, with the tax revenues re-
turning to the Social Security fund. Each of these requirements
would enable partial support of disabled children, while making
95. Again, because this Article focuses on SSI, the proposal is presented as a change
in the SSI eligibility requirements. A similar exception could be made to the eligibility
requirements of other programs as well.
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it difficult to manipulate the trust structure for tax or other
benefits.
The most salient feature of this arrangement would be propor-
tional, not dollar-for-dollar, reduction in SSI benefits for every
payment from the trust to the disabled person. For every dollar
of trust support, a beneficiary could lose fifty cents of SSI bene-
fits. Payments of income and principal from a qualified trust
would not count for purposes of establishing initial eligibility for
SSI, so a disabled beneficiary could receive income supplements
from the trust without being disqualified from receiving SSI
benefits. 6
Thus, people without resources would not receive as many to-
tal support dollars from the combination of SSI benefits and
trust disbursements as would people with family resources, and
people with family resources would not receive as much public
support as would people with no family resources at all. How-
ever, the very real monetary benefit available to a person whose
family is willing to contribute support would provide an incen-
tive for parents and others to set up qualified trusts.
A number of other requirements for the trust structure would
ensure that such trusts could not be unduly manipulated for fi-
nancial gain to unintended persons. First, the beneficiary would
be entitled to all of-the trust income, payable at least quarterly.
This would prevent manipulation of trust income to evade pro-
portionate benefit reductions.9
Second, at the disabled child's death, the balance remaining in
the trust, if any, would be taxed, with the tax revenues returning
to the Social Security fund. In the alternative, a set percentage
of the funds remaining in trust could be turned over to the gov-
ernment.9 During the disabled person's lifetime, no other per-
son could receive property from the trust. This would prevent
depletion of the trust to avoid the death tax through lifetime
payouts to third persons. Finally, anything remaining in the
96. There would be a limit to the amount of money which could be received from the
trust while still receiving SSI benefits. It would depend on the proportionate amount of
reduction in benefits. For example, if SSI benefits were reduced fifty cents for each dol-
lar received from the trust, the beneficiary could receive twice the dollar value of his SSI
benefit from the trust before becoming completely ineligible for SSI.
97. For example, in the absence of such a requirement, the trustee could pay out
more than enough funds to eliminate SSI benefits for the year, but not pay out in suc-
ceeding years so that benefits would resume even though the disabled person might still
have use of the money already paid out.
98. This suggestion is consistent with a requirement of self-sufficiency trusts that
50% is turned over to the charitable trust component at the death of the beneficiary. See
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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trust after the payment of the death tax could pass as the child
appoints by will, or in default of appointment, to the remainder-
men designated by the settlor.
B. Advantages of a Qualified Trust
The proposed qualified trust would improve the quality of life
of the disabled person by enabling her to maintain the minimum
level already provided by SSI while supplementing that level
with payments from the parents' trust. This opportunity to
make a real difference in the quality of the disabled child's life
would provide a powerful incentive for parents and other inter-
ested persons to make testamentary or lifetime provisions for
the child. Most parents have this natural impulse anyway, but
they may feel compelled to act against it due to the futility of
leaving property to a disabled child.
The qualified trust would also reduce society's burden. Even
though the proposal would lower the percentage reduction in
SSI benefits for each parental contribution from one hundred
percent to fifty percent, it could actually decrease the total
amount paid though SSI because it would encourage more par-
ents to give. Taxation of the trust corpus at the child's death
would then provide further reimbursement to the SSI program.
This qualified trust improves the position of all parties in-
volved. Thus, the government would benefit financially, because
under the present system many people are completely supported
by public benefits even though their families could make some
contribution to their support. The disabled child would have an
improved quality of life. Finally, the parents could achieve at
least some peace of mind.
C. Comparison with the QTIP Exception to the Estate Tax
This proposed trust is analogous to the marital qualified ter-
minable interest property trust (QTIP), which allows the estate
to claim the marital deduction for terminable interests, such as
life estates in property passing to a surviving spouse, as long as
those terminable interests are in a qualifying trust.9 The QTIP
99. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1988). In other words, the QTIP allows estate taxes to be
deferred until the deaths of both spouses, but allows each spouse to control the long-
term disposition of his own property. See Cameron, Hoffman & Ytterberg, Marital and
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epitomizes a successful exception to existing rules, where a lim-
ited exception can be used to advanfice social policy objectives.'
Like the QTIP, the proposed qualified trust for the disabled
would be a limited exception to existing regulations. Both re-
quire that no one have the power to appoint any property to
anyone other than the life beneficiary (the wife or the disabled
person) during the beneficiary's lifetime. 10' Unless the trust pro-
ceeds are completely exhausted during the beneficiary's lifetime,
this assures that the remaining property will be subject to tax in
the beneficiary's estate. Both types of trust would entitle the
beneficiary to all of the income from the trust (or, in the case of
a QTIP, to all of the income from a designated portion of the
trust) payable at least annually.'
The QTIP allows a limited exception to the general rule that a
terminable interest is not eligible for the marital deduction. It is
perceived as offering greater flexibility in estate planning, espe-
cially when a person wants her spouse to have lifetime security,
but also wants to ensure that her own children ultimately re-
ceive whatever remains of the property. 03 The QTIP allows this
flexibility while assuring that any property that in fact goes to
persons other than the surviving spouse will ultimately be taxed
in that surviving spouse's estate.104 "
The qualified trust for the disabled would allow a similarly
limited exception to the SSI benefit reduction rules. It would
offer flexibility in planning for disabled persons where a parent's
estate is not by itself large enough to comfortably support the
disabled child without government aid. It would allow this flexi-
bility, yet provide for a Social Security tax to be imposed on
remaining trust assets at the death of the disabled beneficiary.
D. Objections to a Qualified Trust Exception
There are, of course, certain problems inherent in this pro-
posal. The most obvious objection is that this plan would set up
Premarital Agreements, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 1095, 1121 (1987). Previously, of course, no
marital deduction was allowed for terminable iiterests in property because if that were
allowed, the remainder interest could escape estate taxation entirely.
100. In the case of the QTIP, the exception makes it easier to provide for both a
spouse and the children of a marriage.
101. See I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(II) (1988).:
102. See id. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I).
103. See J. PRICE, CONTEMPORARY ESTATE PLANNING §§ 5.11, 5.18 (1983).
104. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1988); see also Cameron, Hoffman & Ytterberg, supra note
99, at 1121.
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a system whereby the goveriment would have to support people
who have other resources. This is a contradiction to the usual
position that SSI and programs like it are solely intended as a
safety net for those persons who have no other options. 10 5
As we have seen, however, excluding supplementary benefits
will more likely reduce supplementary benefits than reduce the
number of people receiving'SSI. Thus, it is not necessarily true
that more money could be distributed among those who have no
hope of help from other sources. 10 6
A second possible objection is that these qualified trusts will
require periodic review. As with the QTIP exception to the es-
tate tax rules, however, this regulation can be achieved within
the existing administrative structure, which determines initial
and continuing eligibility for benefits.
IV. CONCLUSION
Current eligibility requirements for social benefit programs for
the disabled are apparently designed to assure that only the
truly needy will receive aid.,These programs actually discourage
middle-class parents who cannot completely support their dis-
abled offspring from contributing anything to the child's sup-
port. A dollar-for-dollar reduction in benefits to someone who
has received funds from a. gift or estate does not necessarily
mean that disabled persons who are potential estate and gift
beneficiaries will forgo public benefits. Instead, it means that
parents will dispose of their estates so that their offspring will
continue to receive public benefits, even if it means that the dis-
abled children will receive. little or no inheritance.
Congress should create alimited exception to these eligibility
requirements. By allowing benefit recipients to receive gifts and
'inheritances which meet strict limitations, the law would en-
courage people to provide for disabled family members. This
could eventually decrease dependence on government assistance.
It could even achieve the elusive goal of improving the quality of
life of some of the less fortunate members of our society.
105. See supra Part II.B.
106. Moreover, there is precedent for favoring quality of life over purely economic
considerations. Consider, for example,'the homestead exemption, which exempts owner-
occupied housing (up to a certain dollar value) from the claims of most creditors, includ-
ing the state, if it has provided services to the disabled person. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §
815.20 (owner is liable only for such debts as mortgages, laborers', mechanics' and
purchase money liens and taxes).
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